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## GENERAL

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] 3.	Reported Indian attempt to obtain nonaggression pact with Peiping:	_
	India tried but failed to obtain a nonaggression	25X1

This official believes Nehru is publicizing the Tibet agreement of 29 April as a virtual pledge of nonaggression in the hope that the Chinese will consider it in the same light.

Comment: According to its preamble, the Sino-Indian agreement is based on principles of mutual nonaggression and peaceful coexistence. Both New Delhi and Peiping have in their public announcements emphasized this preamble rather than the operative sections dealing with Tibetan trade and travel.

25X1A

This is the first reliable report that India has been seeking a firmer nonaggression declaration from Peiping. However, press reports that the Indonesian government is interested in a multilateral nonaggression pact with India, Burma, and Communist China have received a very favorable response from leading Indian newspapers.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

# 4. Civil war threatened in Saigon:

25X1

25X1A

There is a

definite danger that fighting may break out between rival war lord groups and it is not clear what position the Vietnamese army might take.

The American chargé, moreover, has information which suggests that antiwhite rioting may occur.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese labor minister told the American chargé in Saigon that morale in the army was 'practically nonexistent' and that the Viet Minh would win any elections which might be agreed on at Geneva. He said many youths were fleeing from the city to the country to evade conscription.

aggravate the weakening French military and political position in the rest of Indochina.

Two legionnaire battalions from Africa are due to arrive in Saigon within two weeks, however, and would add to the French capability for maintaining over-all control even though internecine fighting or antiforeign rioting occurs.

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
5. Security situation in Annam called precarious:	
··	
An American economic aid official in Vietnam reports the security situation precarious and the general outlook ding.	on there is
Large numbers of Vietnamese are me the capital of Annam at Hué from the hinterland and many of the probably Viet Minh agents.	noving into ese are
The only bright spot in the picture is south, where an able colonel and provincial chief are maintaini ciplined and effective militia.	s in the ng a dis-
The American chargé in Saigon desc of the two generals in Annam as "an incompetent whose mouth i as his fundament," the other as a "bungler." Their headquarter says, is "the burial ground of elephants."	s as wide
6. French may be considering regroupment in Tonkin:	
General Cogny recently told the Brit attaché that a regroupment of his for hind the Bamboo Canal-Red River lin map, page 7) was tactically advisable present circumstances. Cogny said,	rces be- ne (see e under however
that he would not take such action "now" because of the adverse it would have on civilian morale. He also pointed out that the s	effect

Comment: The American army attaché reported on 20 May rumors that Generals Ely, Salan, Navarre, Pelissier and Hinh have been discussing the advisability of a similar regroupment. Such a step would be tantamount to abandonment of almost half the delta.

part of the delta, which would be abandoned by the move, was heavily Catholic and the source of the strongest support the French had in

Tonkin.

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


### **NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

• •	Turkey declines invitation to Moslem conference on Palestine:
25X1A	Turkey is declining Jordan's recent invitation to participate in the proposed Jerusalem con- ference of all Moslem states—including Afghanistan and Indonesia—on the Palestine
	issue, according to the under secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Ankara is notifying Jordan, and informing all the Moslem governments that it opposes such a meeting and believes it would only increase Arab-Israeli tension.
	The Turkish notification specifies that means are already available to maintain the Arab-Israeli status quo and expresses willingness to join the American-British-French declaration of 1950 designed to enforce it.
	Comment: Turkey decided immediately upon receipt of the invitation not to attend the conference but has been seeking constructive suggestions to include in its answer. Because of Turkish-Pakistani treaty obligations, Ankara has been in a dilemma over Pakistani's suggestion that such a conference be held.

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25X1



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Comment: Initial estimates of 400,000 participants were lowered when the Free German Youth (FDJ) announced that political reliability would be the criterion for selecting delegates and some FDJ groups were told that because of the lack of reliability of their membership, few, if any, delegates would be sent to Berlin.

The railroad plans now suggest that the rally will rival in size that of 1950, which was attended by about 440,000 delegates, and that the FDJ's criterion of "political reliability" will be loosely applied.

25X1A

#### WESTERN EUROPE

# 11. French and West German negotiators agree on new Saar statute:

25X1A	

The Saar agreement which West German chancellor Adenauer and French vice premier Teitgen reached on 20 May provides for Europeanization of the Saar in three stages on the basis of the van Naters plan.

Stage one would put the Saar under the control of the Council of Europe; stage two under the popularly elected European assembly; and stage three under the European Political Community (EPC). Each stage reached is to be irrevocable, and France and West Germany guarantee the settlement pending conclusion of a German peace treaty.

In the economic field, the objective is a gradual grant to West Germany of rights similar to those of France, without jeopardizing economic co-operation between France and the Saar.

Comment: Adenauer may encounter some cabinet opposition to this agreement but there is little doubt that he will be able to get Bundestag support.

Teitgen, although given full powers to negotiate by the French cabinet, is reported "very nervous" as to whether the cabinet will accept this Saar settlement. Now that he has committed the

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Popular Republicans, the Gaullist ministers may decide to have their major showdown with pro-EDC elements when the Saar agreement is presented rather than later. On similar occasions in the past, however, the Laniel government has not allowed the Gaullists' threats of resignation to deter its progress toward EDC ratification.

12.	Virtual accord reached in US-Icelandic talks:
25X1A	The American minister at Reykjavik reports that virtually complete accord has been reached with Iceland on revising the terms of carrying out the bilateral defense agreement of 1951.

The American contractors will be removed this year if possible, and steps will be taken to reduce contacts between Americans and the local population.

In return, the Icelanders will permit the entry of about 2,000 more American troops, the establishment of two permanent antiaircraft units, and additional port construction.

Comment: This understanding eliminates for the time being Iceland's threat to demand a basic revision or termination of the agreement. It does not appear to enhance prospects for the United States' obtaining a second air base. Moreover, difficulties are likely to arise should local firms prove incapable of carrying out defense construction contracts.

#### LATIN AMERICA

	25	5X1
	President Arbenz is quoted	<u> </u>
25X1A	as stating that he plans to replace the	
23/17	United States military mission in Guatemala 25	5X1
L	United States military mission in Guatemala 25 with "European technicians and/or pilots,"	<i>)</i> /\
	since the Americans 'know nothing about the arms now arriving."	

- 11 -

Many Guatemalan army officers are said to have "grave misgivings" over the arrival of arms on the Alfhem and to fear that a "large group of Soviet or Satellite instructors" may take over some of their positions. Many officers seem to feel that they should now take a stronger anti-Communist stand.

25X1

The new arms are being divided equally between the two military garrisons in Guatemala City,

25X1

<u>Comment</u>: Guatemala has not asked for extension of the United States army and air mission agreements which lapsed over a year ago. Both missions are still in Guatemala and enjoy cordial relations with Guatemalan officers.

The equal division of the new equipment, the type of which is still unknown, between the two regiments in the capital appears designed to prevent either from gaining preponderant strength. It indicates awareness of the decisive role key commanders could play in any attempt to overthrow the government.

25X1

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25X1	
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15.	United Fruit strike in Guatemala believed linked to strike in Honduras:
25X1A	Ambassador Peurifoy believes that the strike begun on 20 May among United Fruit Company workers on Guatemala's Caribbean coast was called to coincide with labor disturbances in
	earlier expressed fear that a strike might spread to his firm's subsidiary on the Guatemalan Pacific coast. Communist leader Pellecer appears to have instigated the walkout.
	On 15 May the workers asked the Guatemalan army to guard the Honduran frontier during the impending strike "to avoid any provocation from abroad."
	Comment: This strike, coinciding with the walkouts in Honduras since early this month, confronts United Fruit with its greatest labor tie-up in history. It appears designed to force a general settlement in Honduras on terms favorable to labor.
	Most of the north coast region of Honduras remains paralyzed, although settlement was reported in one area on 20 May. No violence has been reported, but the situation is tense.
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25/17